Home / Flash Loan Attacks on DeFi Protocols: How They Work and How to Stop Them

Flash Loan Attacks on DeFi Protocols: How They Work and How to Stop Them

Flash Loan Attacks on DeFi Protocols: How They Work and How to Stop Them

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Flash loan attacks aren’t science fiction. They’re real, they happen every month, and they’ve stolen over flash loan attacks $1.7 billion from DeFi protocols in 2025 alone. You don’t need a billion-dollar bank account to pull one off-just a few hundred dollars in gas fees and a basic understanding of how smart contracts work. That’s the scary part. These attacks exploit the very design of decentralized finance: speed, openness, and automation. And they’re getting smarter.

What Exactly Is a Flash Loan?

A flash loan is a loan with no collateral. No credit check. No waiting. You borrow $10 million in ETH or USDC, do whatever you want with it, and pay it back-all within one blockchain transaction. If you fail to repay, the whole thing vanishes like it never happened. It’s like borrowing a car, driving it into a wall, and returning it undamaged before the owner even notices you took it.

This isn’t magic. It’s code. The smart contract that powers the flash loan checks: Did the borrower send back the exact amount plus fees? If yes, the transaction succeeds. If no, the entire transaction is rolled back. No one loses money. The attacker loses gas. And the system moves on.

But here’s the catch: while the loan itself is safe, the actions you take with that borrowed money aren’t monitored. That’s where the attack begins.

How a Flash Loan Attack Unfolds

Here’s how a typical attack works in four steps:

  1. Borrow: The attacker takes a huge amount of Token A from a flash loan provider like AAVE or dYdX.
  2. Manipulate: They swap Token A for Token B on a decentralized exchange (DEX) like Uniswap. By dumping a massive amount of Token A, they crash its price. Then they use that cheap Token A to buy up Token B, inflating its price.
  3. Exploit: They deposit the inflated Token B as collateral on a lending protocol that uses that same DEX as its only price feed. Because the price looks high, the protocol lets them borrow way more Token A than they should be allowed to.
  4. Repaid and Gone: They use the newly borrowed Token A to pay back the original flash loan. The transaction closes. The attacker walks away with free Token A, and the protocol is left with worthless collateral.
It all happens in under 15 seconds. The blockchain doesn’t care if it’s fair-it just executes code. And if the code doesn’t check for price manipulation, it gets fooled.

Real Attacks, Real Losses

These aren’t theoretical. They’ve cost millions-and sometimes hundreds of millions.

In April 2022, an attacker borrowed $1 billion from AAVE and used it to take over Beanstalk Farms’ governance. They changed the rules to mint new tokens, drained the treasury, and walked away with $182 million. The attack didn’t even need to manipulate prices-it manipulated trust.

PancakeBunny lost $200 million in 2021 when attackers used flash loans to flood its liquidity pools, then pulled out their tokens before anyone noticed. The BUNNY token dropped 90% in hours.

Even in March 2025, KiloEx lost $7 million because its price oracle relied on a single DEX. Attackers swapped small amounts of a low-volume token to distort its value, then borrowed against it. The fix? Simple: stop trusting one exchange for price data.

A coyote slingshots tokens into a DEX, inflating another token like a balloon while a confused robot stands by.

Why These Attacks Keep Working

Three reasons:

  • Oracles are single points of failure. Most DeFi protocols get price data from one or two DEXs. If you can move the price on one, you control the whole system.
  • Smart contracts aren’t audited well enough. Many protocols launch with minimal testing. Reentrancy bugs, missing access controls, and unchecked inputs are still common.
  • There’s no delay. Transactions execute instantly. No human review. No time to react.
The attacker doesn’t need to be a genius. They just need to find the weakest link-and most DeFi protocols still have weak links.

How to Prevent Flash Loan Attacks

Protocols that survive these attacks use three proven strategies:

  1. Use multiple oracles. Don’t rely on Uniswap alone. Pull prices from Chainlink, Pyth, or several DEXs. Average them. If one feed is manipulated, the rest keep things stable.
  2. Implement TWAP (Time-Weighted Average Price). Instead of using the current price, use the average price over the last 5, 10, or 30 minutes. A flash loan can’t move the average in one block.
  3. Code like your life depends on it. Use the checks-effects-interactions pattern. Add access controls. Test every edge case. Use tools like Slither and MythX to scan for bugs before deployment. Audits aren’t optional-they’re your last line of defense.
Some protocols now add circuit breakers: if a token’s price moves more than 10% in a single block, trading pauses for 30 seconds. That’s enough time for humans to step in.

A detective hedgehog protects a fortress of multi-oracle towers as a fleeing coyote drops an exploit sign.

What Users Should Do

If you’re providing liquidity or staking tokens:

  • Avoid protocols that use a single price feed.
  • Check if the project has been audited by a reputable firm like CertiK, Trail of Bits, or OpenZeppelin.
  • Look for TWAP or multi-oracle setups in their documentation.
  • Don’t assume “big name” means safe. Even AAVE has been targeted.
Your money isn’t protected by blockchain-it’s protected by good code. And not all code is good.

The Bigger Picture

Flash loan attacks are a symptom of a larger problem: DeFi is still too trusting. It assumes that because something is automated, it’s secure. But automation doesn’t mean safety-it means scale.

As attacks get more complex, so do defenses. Insurance protocols like Nexus Mutual and Cover Protocol are now offering coverage for flash loan exploits. Some DeFi teams are hiring former hackers to test their systems. Academic papers from MIT and Stanford are proposing new oracle architectures that use zero-knowledge proofs to verify prices without revealing data.

The future won’t be free of attacks. But it can be harder to exploit.

What’s Next?

The next big attack vector? Cross-chain flash loans. Imagine borrowing on Ethereum, manipulating a price on Solana, and repaying on Polygon-all in one atomic operation. The tech exists. The attacks are coming.

Protocols that don’t adapt will lose. Users who don’t learn will lose more.

The lesson isn’t that DeFi is broken. It’s that it’s still young. And like any young system, it’s being tested-hard.

Can flash loans be used for legitimate purposes?

Yes. Flash loans are used legitimately for arbitrage, collateral swaps, and refinancing. For example, a user might borrow ETH to repay a loan on one platform, then use the freed-up collateral to borrow more on another. These are legal, profitable, and common. The problem isn’t the flash loan-it’s when it’s used to manipulate prices or exploit bugs.

Why don’t DeFi protocols just block large flash loans?

Because that defeats the purpose. Flash loans are designed to be permissionless. Limiting loan sizes would make them less useful for legitimate users and push activity to less regulated platforms. The goal isn’t to restrict access-it’s to make manipulation impossible, even with large loans.

Are flash loan attacks illegal?

Legally, it’s a gray area. Since blockchain transactions are immutable and anonymous, prosecuting attackers is extremely difficult. No government has successfully convicted someone for a flash loan attack yet. But regulators in the U.S., EU, and Singapore are starting to classify these as market manipulation, which could change enforcement in the future.

Can I protect myself if I’m just holding DeFi tokens?

You can’t stop an attack, but you can avoid risky protocols. Stick to platforms with transparent audits, multi-oracle price feeds, and public incident response plans. If a project doesn’t talk about security, assume it’s vulnerable. Also, avoid staking in protocols that rely on obscure or low-liquidity tokens-they’re easier to manipulate.

Why are flash loan attacks increasing in 2025?

Because the tools are easier to use now. Attackers use pre-built exploit scripts, automated bots, and AI to scan for vulnerable contracts. The cost of launching an attack has dropped. At the same time, DeFi TVL (total value locked) has grown to over $120 billion-making it a bigger target. More money, easier tools, and slow defenses = more attacks.

16 comment

Derajanique Mckinney

Derajanique Mckinney

lol why are we even talking about this like it's a surprise? 🤡

Paul Lyman

Paul Lyman

Interesting breakdown, but I think the real issue isn't the flash loans-it's the reliance on single-source oracles. If you're using Uniswap as your only price feed, you're basically handing the keys to your vault to anyone with a bot and $500 in gas. This isn't a bug, it's negligence.

Protocols that use Chainlink or TWAP are orders of magnitude safer. The fact that this keeps happening means teams are either lazy, rushed, or don't care. And honestly? That's scarier than the attack itself.

Sheetal Tolambe

Sheetal Tolambe

Really appreciate how you laid this out. I've been staking in a few DeFi pools and didn't even realize how many of them were using single-price feeds. I'm going back to check my positions now. Thanks for the clarity!

Also, love the TWAP suggestion-sounds like a simple fix that could save so much pain. Hope more teams adopt this soon.

gurmukh bhambra

gurmukh bhambra

you know what’s really happening? This isn’t just hacking-it’s a coordinated effort by the big banks to scare people away from DeFi. They can’t compete so they fund these attacks to make crypto look unstable. I’ve seen the patterns. The same wallets pop up after every big exploit. They’re not random. They’re paid.

And don’t tell me it’s ‘code’-code doesn’t have motives. People do. And someone’s pulling strings behind the scenes. Wake up.

Also, why is AAVE always the target? Coincidence? I think not.

Sunny Kashyap

Sunny Kashyap

flash loans? sounds like indian scam. why not just use bank? everything is fake here. america also fake. crypto is for fools.

we have real money in india. not this digital nonsense.

james mason

james mason

Oh, so now we’re discussing ‘flash loan attacks’ like they’re a novel concept? Darling, this is 2025. We’ve been watching this play out since 2020. The real tragedy isn’t the $1.7 billion lost-it’s that people still treat DeFi like it’s some kind of meritocracy when it’s just a casino rigged by people who understand recursion better than you understand your own credit score.

And if you’re staking in a protocol without a formal audit from Trail of Bits? Honey, you’re not an investor. You’re a donation.

Also, I’m still waiting for someone to explain why we’re still using EVM chains for finance. But I digress.

Rosanna Gulisano

Rosanna Gulisano

if you dont audit you deserve to get robbed

Saurav Deshpande

Saurav Deshpande

Let’s be honest-this whole system is a simulation. The blockchain isn’t decentralized. It’s just a distributed ledger controlled by miners, whales, and the same venture capitalists who ran the dot-com bubble.

Flash loans? They’re not the problem. They’re the symptom. The real flaw is that we’ve built an entire financial system on code written by 22-year-olds who learned Solidity from YouTube tutorials and think ‘immutable’ means ‘unhackable.’

We’re not building finance. We’re building a digital pyramid scheme with better branding.

And the fact that people still call this ‘innovation’ tells me we’re not ready for this. We’re just excited by the noise.

Maybe we should ask: who benefits from this chaos? Not the users. Not the devs. Definitely not the people paying gas fees.

It’s the VCs who dumped their tokens before the exploit and cashed out during the FOMO.

And now they’re writing the next whitepaper.

We’re not being hacked. We’re being harvested.

Cory Munoz

Cory Munoz

Just wanted to say thanks for writing this so clearly. I’ve been trying to explain flash loan risks to my cousin who just invested in a new DeFi project, and this is exactly what I needed to send him.

I’m glad you mentioned TWAP and multi-oracles-those are the quiet heroes of DeFi security. Most people don’t even know those terms exist, let alone why they matter.

Also, big respect for calling out the ‘big name = safe’ myth. I’ve lost count of how many ‘trusted’ protocols got drained. The tech is powerful, but the culture still needs to grow up.

Keep sharing this stuff. It matters.

Jean Manel

Jean Manel

Let’s cut the fluff. You listed three prevention strategies. That’s cute. But here’s the truth: 95% of DeFi protocols won’t implement any of them. Why? Because audits cost money. TWAP adds latency. Multi-oracles increase complexity. And none of that generates hype or attracts FOMO capital.

So what do they do instead? They launch with a ‘security partner’ logo on their website that’s just a logo from a one-person audit firm that charges $5k.

The entire industry is a performance art piece where the audience thinks they’re investing in tech-but they’re really just betting on who’s better at marketing their vulnerability.

And the saddest part? The people who lose money? They’ll still come back next time. Because hope is cheaper than education.

William P. Barrett

William P. Barrett

There’s a deeper philosophical layer here that’s rarely discussed. Flash loan attacks expose a fundamental tension in decentralized systems: autonomy versus safety.

We built DeFi to remove intermediaries, to trust code over people. But code doesn’t have ethics. It doesn’t have context. It just executes. And so we’ve created a world where the most efficient system is also the most exploitable.

Is it possible to design a protocol that is both permissionless and resilient? Maybe. But it requires a new kind of thinking-not just technical, but epistemological.

We’re not just writing smart contracts. We’re writing the rules of a new society. And like all societies, it needs norms, not just algorithms.

Maybe the real solution isn’t better oracles-but better collective judgment. A culture that values caution over speed. That’s the harder problem.

Jasmine Neo

Jasmine Neo

Wow. Another ‘educational’ post that treats users like they’re toddlers who need a bedtime story about oracles.

Let me break it down in 10-year-old terms: if you’re using a single DEX for pricing, you’re basically leaving your front door open and then crying when someone steals your TV.

And don’t get me started on ‘TWAP’-it’s not magic, it’s just a lag. Attackers will adapt. They already have bots that simulate TWAP behavior and time their exploits around it.

And the audits? Please. Most are box-ticking exercises. I’ve seen audits that missed reentrancy bugs in 3-line functions.

DeFi isn’t broken. It’s designed to be predatory. The only people who win are the ones who built the system, not the ones who joined it.

Also, why are we still on EVM? This is 2025. We’re still using a 2018 architecture. Pathetic.

Ron Murphy

Ron Murphy

Interesting piece. The cross-chain flash loan vector is definitely the next frontier-already seeing early PoCs on bridges like LayerZero and Synapse.

What’s concerning is that most cross-chain protocols don’t even have price feeds yet. They’re just trusting block headers from other chains. That’s like trusting a stranger’s photo of a bank vault to verify your balance.

Also, I’d add one more mitigation: rate-limiting based on historical behavior. If a wallet has never interacted with a protocol and suddenly tries to borrow $50M? Flag it. Not block it-flag it.

Human oversight still has value. Even in DeFi.

Anna Mitchell

Anna Mitchell

thank you for writing this. i’ve been nervous about staking lately but didn’t know why. this helps me understand what to look for. i’m checking my wallets now 💛

Frech Patz

Frech Patz

While the technical analysis is sound, I would encourage a more rigorous examination of the economic incentives driving these exploits. The marginal cost of launching a flash loan attack-gas fees, script development, and time-is often less than 0.1% of the potential gain. This creates a negative expected utility for protocol defenders, who must invest in comprehensive, continuous security measures, while attackers need only succeed once.

Furthermore, the absence of legal recourse and the pseudonymous nature of blockchain identities create a classic free-rider problem in security investment. No single protocol has sufficient incentive to raise the baseline, leading to a race to the bottom.

This is not merely a technical failure-it is a market failure in decentralized security provision.

Paul Lyman

Paul Lyman

Just saw someone mention cross-chain flash loans-that’s the real nightmare. Imagine borrowing on Ethereum, manipulating the price on Solana’s DEX, then repaying on Polygon-all in one atomic transaction. The bridges don’t even have real-time price feeds yet.

And we’re already seeing exploit kits targeting LayerZero and Axelar. This isn’t theoretical. It’s happening in the shadows right now.

Protocols that think ‘we’re not on Solana, we’re safe’ are already dead. The attack surface is expanding faster than the defenses. We need cross-chain oracle standards. Now.

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